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Rational expectations
AppendixAbstract
This paper presents experimental evidence from a monetary sticky
price economy in which output and inﬂa t i o nd e p e n do ne x p e c t e df u -
ture inﬂation. With rational inﬂation expectations, the economy does
not generate persistent deviations of output and inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s e
to a monetary shock. In the experimental sessions, however, output
and inﬂation display considerable persistence and regular cyclical pat-
terns. Such behavior emerges because subjects’ inﬂation expectations
fail to be captured by rational expectations functions. Instead, a Re-
stricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE), which assumes that agents
use optimal but ’simple’ forecast functions, describes subjects’ inﬂa-
tion expectations surprisingly well and explains the observed behavior
of output and inﬂation.
KEYWORDS: Experiments, Output and Inﬂation Dynamics, Re-
stricted Perceptions Equilibrium, Rational Expectations
JEL-Class.No.: E32, E37, C91
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June 2005Non-Technical Summary
For a long time economists have suspected that expectations formation in
the economy could itself be a source of economic ﬂuctuations. For example,
what happens if agents do not have a correct model of the economy? What if
they instead use a simpler or diﬀerent model for forecasting purposes? Can
a misspeciﬁed model generate actual outcomes ,w h i c ht h e nf e e di n t ob e l i e f s ,
in such a way that the agents’ misspeciﬁed model appears to be ratiﬁed?
To date tangible evidence on whether or not agents may coordinate on
equilibria with less-than-fully-rational expectations is rare. The goal of this
paper is to present an analysis of laboratory experiments with human sub-
jects, the aim of which is to discern the nature of subjects’ forecasting ability.
Human subjects in the experiments are asked to forecast future inﬂation
rates. Their forecasts are used as an input to an underlying economic model
and thereby determine a new data point for output and inﬂation. The
new data is announced to agents and thereafter the process repeats itself.
The main objective of the paper is to analyze whether the agents learn to
coordinate on the (unique) rational expectations equilibrium or whether the
outcome is characterized by less-than-fully-rational expectations, a so-called
‘Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium’, in which agents use simple forecast
functions only and outcomes and beliefs reinforce each other in the way
described above.
The experiments show that when an equilibrium with less-than-fully-
rational expectations exists, human agents, for a considerable period of time,
coordinate on such an equilibrium. Compared to the rational expectations
equilibrium, output and inﬂation then display much more persistence and
inﬂation reacts in a sluggish and persistent way to nominal disturbances.
Eventually, coordination on this equilibrium breaks down in intriguing ways,
as agents learn to improve their forecasts. Interestingly, when the less-than-
fully-rational equilibrium does not exist, the agents tend to coordinate on
the rational expectations equilibrium more readily.
Overall, the results show that equilibria with less-than-fully-rational ex-
pectations may be an important ingredient for understanding the behavior
of economic time series, e.g., the persistence in the behavior of output and
inﬂation, and that convergence to rational expectations might take more
time than generally assumed.
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Rational expectations models with nominal rigidities, workhorses of current
macroeconomics, seem to have rather weak internal propagation mechanisms
and therefore face diﬃculties in matching the persistence inherent in output
and inﬂation data. Especially, matching the reactions of output and inﬂation
in response to nominal shocks has proven cumbersome (e.g. Chari et al.
(2000) and Nelson (1998)).
An important literature suggests that this diﬃculty is the result of
overly simplistic models, i.e., lack of major frictions, and can be over-
come by modeling these frictions, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003) or Chris-
tiano et al. (2005). Other contributions suggest, however, that implausibly
strong rationality assumptions may be the source of the persistence prob-
lem. In particular, relaxing the assumption of rational expectations can
substantially strengthen the internal propagation mechanisms of fairly sim-
ple economic models, e.g., Evans and Ramey (1992), Evans and Honkapohja
(1993),(2001), Sargent (1999), or Adam (2005).
This paper studies a simple monetary sticky price economy with nominal
demand shocks in the experimental laboratory and assesses whether devi-
ations of expectations from rational expectations are an important factor
contributing to the persistence of output and inﬂation. Importantly, the pa-
per presents direct evidence on the relevance of non-rationalities and their
implications for the persistence of output and inﬂation.
Resorting to laboratory experiments is justiﬁed on the grounds that ex-
pectations in the ﬁeld remain largely unobservable. This makes it diﬃcult
to identify deviations from rational expectations. Moreover, without ref-
erence to a speciﬁc model, the economic relevance of identiﬁed deviations
cannot be interpreted but reaching consensus about the relevant economic
model seems diﬃcult. Laboratory experiments do not face such problems
because agents’ expectations can be made directly observable and the eco-
nomic model is true by deﬁnition.
The monetary economy studied in this paper is extremely simple: a
cash-in-advance constraint forces agents to hold money in equilibrium and
sticky prices cause nominal demand shocks to have real eﬀects. Since prices
are preset for one period only, the model displays ’New Classical’ features
under rational expectations, i.e., output reacts to unexpected money shocks
only and inﬂation lags output by one period. As a result, the model does
not generate persistent deviations of output and inﬂation in response to a
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implies that current output and inﬂation depend on lagged endogenous vari-
ables, agents’ expectations of future inﬂation rates, and exogenous nominal
demand shocks.1 Thus, whenever expectations deviate from rational ones,
the behavior of output and inﬂation also deviates from the white noise pre-
diction.
To test for the relevance of such deviations, subjects in the experiments
are asked to predict future inﬂation rates. Subjects have an incentive to
provide the best possible forecast because the payments they receive depend
negatively on their forecast errors. Subjects’ inﬂation forecasts are then sub-
stituted into the model’s temporary equilibrium equation and determine a
model-consistent outcome for output and inﬂation. The new output level
and inﬂation rate is announced to subjects and thereafter the process re-
peats itself. Overall, 420 observations for output and inﬂation have been
generated in the experiments and 4200 individual inﬂation forecasts have
been collected.
Unlike predicted by the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), output
and inﬂation in the baseline experiments show regular and persistent devia-
tions from steady state. In particular, both variables display strong positive
autocorrelation. Such behavior emerges because the inﬂation expectations
of subjects participating in the experiments fail to be captured by the ex-
pectations functions implied by the REE. This occurs although the REE is
determinate, expectationally stable in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja
(2001), and has a very simple structure.
The paper shows that instead subjects’ inﬂation expectations are de-
scribed surprisingly well by a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE).
The RPE assumes that agents use optimal but ’simple’ forecasts, i.e., fore-
cast that minimize mean squared forecast error but that condition on a single
explanatory variable only. Interestingly, the REE forecast function itself is
simple in this sense because it suggests conditioning inﬂation forecasts on
lagged output. Nevertheless, the restriction to simple forecasts gives rise to
an additional RPE in which agents condition inﬂation forecasts on lagged
inﬂation. Given that agents do so, these forecasts outperform forecasts that
condition on lagged output.2
The forecast functions implied by the RPE in which agents condition
on lagged inﬂation capture the inﬂation expectations of subjects in the ex-
periments extremely well. The RPE also predicts output and inﬂation to
1The ’temporary equilibrium’ concept is discussed in Grandmont (1988).
2Forecasts that condition on lagged inﬂation do not outperform other forecasts that
condition on more than one variable. Such forecasts, therefore, fail to be rational.
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in the experiments and a sluggish and persistent response of output and
inﬂation to a nominal demand shock.
Over time some divergence of expectations from this RPE can be ob-
served but evidence in favor of convergence to the REE remains weak, even
after more than 100 model periods. Yet, for model parameterizations for
which the RPE does not exist, subjects’ inﬂation expectations are largely
consistent with rational forecast functions.
Overall, the experiments show that deviations of expectations from ra-
tional expectations can serve as a powerful endogenous propagation mecha-
nism. Moreover, simple forecast functions seem to describe the forecasts of
relatively unexperienced forecasters fairly well and may be a key ingredient
for explaining the observed persistence of output and inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s e
to nominal shocks.
Experimental studies of expectation formation go back to Schmalensee
(1976) who analyzes price forecasts in a time series context. In this work,
however, no feedback from expectations is present, i.e., the time series fore-
casted by experimental subjects are exogenous and do not depend on their
expectations. Subsequent work analyzes price and expectation formation
in settings with expectational feedback. A substantial body of research
thereby considers experimental asset markets (e.g., Smith et al. (1988);
Sunder (1995) for a survey) but little work exists on expectations forma-
tion in simple macroeconomic models. A notable exception is Marimon and
Sunder (1993), (1994) and Marimon, Spear, and Sunder (1993) who analyze
monetary economies with feedback from inﬂation expectations in a ﬂexible
price version of the setting studied in this paper. The focus in these papers
is on the relationship between the stability and instability under learning of
rational expectations equilibria and the observed laboratory outcomes. The
present paper evaluates the relevance of deviations from rational expecta-
tions for the persistence of output and inﬂation.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
introduces the economic model and derives the temporary equilibrium equa-
tion. The rational expectations and restricted perceptions equilibrium are
derived in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 explains how the experi-
ments have been implemented and sections 6 and 7 discuss the experimental
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I consider a simple variant of a monetary sticky price economy with monop-
olistic competition. This class of models has received considerable attention
in monetary economics recently, e.g., Woodford (2003).
The production sector consists of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms pro-
ducing diﬀerentiated goods with a linear labor technology. Firms set prices
one period in advance but can reoptimize prices every period. Households
maximize discounted lifetime utility over consumption and leisure and are
subject to a cash-in advance constraint, as in Svensson (1985). Finally, the
government generates random demand ﬂuctuations by white noise changes
in real money balances. The model has previously been analyzed in Adam
(2003, 2005) and a more detailed description is given in appendix A.1.
Optimal price setting behavior by monopolistic ﬁrms delivers a Phillips





where Πt denotes the gross inﬂation rate, yt the output level, w(yt,E tΠt+1)
the marginal cost of production, i.e., the equilibrium real wage, and σ ∈
(0,1) the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the goods of dif-
ferent ﬁrms. The real wage w depends on labor demand, which is equal to
output yt,a n do nw o r k e r s ’i n ﬂation expectations EtΠt+1.I n ﬂation expecta-
tions inﬂuence real marginal costs because of the cash-in-advance constraint
faced by workers. Firms must thus forecast inﬂation two periods ahead even
though prices are sticky for a single period only. The real wage w(yt,E tΠt+1)
demanded by workers is assumed to increase with labor demand yt and the
expected inﬂation tax EtΠt+1.3
As long as the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, the demand side
is given by a quantity equation, which implies that real demand equals real





where τt is an iid real cash injection of the government with small bounded
support and small positive mean τ ≥ 0.
Linearizing equations (1) and (2) around the monetary steady state de-












+ bv t (3)
3Suﬃcient conditions for this to be the case are given appendix A.1.
4See appendix A.1 for details.
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t and t−1Πe
t+1 denote the (potentially non-rational) t − 1 expec-
tations of inﬂation in period t and t +1 , respectively, and vt = τt − τ is a









































where Π ≥ 1 and y>0 denote steady state inﬂation and output, respec-
tively, and ε>0 is the real wage elasticity of labor supply in the steady
state.
Equation (3) describes the models’ temporary equilibrium in the language
of Grandmont (1988), i.e., it determines current output and inﬂation as
a function of predetermined variables and agents’ expectations of future
endogenous variables. The temporary equilibrium will be used to implement
the economy in the experimental laboratory.
3R a t i o n a l E x p e c t a t i o n s
Suppose agents’ inﬂation expectations in equation (3) are rational. Then
there exists a stationary rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which





The REE displays ‘New Classical’ properties, i.e., output deviates from
steady state only in response to unexpected monetary shocks. Moreover,
since prices are predetermined, inﬂation is lagging output by one period.
Overall, the behavior of output and inﬂation under rational expectations is
rather simple and does not depend on the labor supply elasticity ε.M o r e -
over, as shown in appendix A.2, no other stationary REE exists.
Clearly, the present model cannot generate persistent deviations of out-
put and inﬂation from steady state under rational expectations.6 This inabil-
ity, which is at odds with estimated impulse responses to monetary shocks,
frequently motivates the introduction of additional frictions, e.g., chapter 2
in Woodford (2003).
5Conditions under which equation (3) holds even when agents’ expectations are not
fully rational are given in Adam (2003).
6This does not hold for explosive REE, see Adam (2003).
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stable) in the sense of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Least-squares and
related learning procedures thus generate convergence to the rational expec-
tations equilibrium. Determinacy, learnability, and simplicity of the REE
should facilitate coordination on the equilibrium in the experiments.
4 Restricted Perceptions
Instead of assuming rational forecasters, this section considers less sophisti-
cated agents that use ’simple’ forecast functions that are based on a single
explanatory variable only. In particular, suppose agents consider the follow-
ing restricted set of forecast models:
Model Y : Πt = αy + βyyt−1 (7a)
Model Π : Πt = αΠ + βΠΠt−1 (7b)
Agents thus forecast inﬂation either as a function of lagged output, i.e.,
when employing Model Y, or as a function of lagged inﬂation, i.e., when
employing Model Π.
The restriction to simple forecast functions can be interpreted in several
ways. First, it might reﬂect the prediction technology available to agents.
Given that subjects in the experiments are relatively unexperienced forecast-
ers, this restriction might not be unrealistic. Alternatively, the restriction
may be interpreted as a temporary phenomenon due to agents who perform
a speciﬁcation search for suitable forecast models. Conditioning forecasts
either on output or on inﬂation may appear to be a natural starting point
for such forecasters. Unsatisfactory prediction performance, however, may
then lead to an enlargement of the set of considered forecast models.
Agents choose a simple forecast model from the class M ∈ {Y,M} but
also the model parameters (αM,β M). In equilibrium agents choose the
model and the parameter values that minimize the mean squared forecast
errors associated with their forecast, as is the case in a rational expectations
equilibrium.7 Formally,
Deﬁnition A Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) in Model M ∗ (M∗ ∈
{Y,Π})i sas t a t i o n a r ys e q u e n c e{yt,Πt}∞
t=0 generated by equation (3)
where
1. Agents use Model M ∗ with parameters (α∗
M,β∗
M) to forecast future
inﬂation rates where (α∗
M,β∗
M) is the orthogonal projection of Πt on
½
(1,y t−1) if M∗ = Y
(1,Πt−1) if M∗ = Π
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M 0={Y, Π}\{M ∗}w h e r e(α0
M,β0
M)is the orthogonal projection of Πt on
½
(1,y t−1) if M0 = Y
(1,Πt−1) if M0 = Π
Clearly, without the restriction to the class of simple forecast models
(7) a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) is a Rational Expectations
Equilibrium (REE): a forecast function that outperforms all possible fore-
cast functions is a rational forecast function.
Note that the class of simple forecast models (7) does not rule out that
agents hold rational expectations. As shown in section 3, expectations of




Thus, the REE is a RPE in Model Y.8
To simplify terminology, however, the remainder of the paper refers to an
RPE in Model Y as the model’s Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
and reserves the term Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) for equi-
libria where the forecasting constraint is strictly binding. Such a RPE may
exist when agents use Model Π for forecasting, i.e.,
t−1Πe
t = αΠ + βΠΠt−1 (8a)
t−1Πe
t+1 = αΠ + αΠβΠ + β2
ΠΠt−1 (8b)
where the 2-step forecast is obtained by iterating on the 1-step forecast





































and shows that inﬂation then depends on lagged inﬂation and on lagged
output. Simple forecast models are thus misspeciﬁed and this allows for
the possibility that Model Π delivers superior predictions than Model Y.
Ideally, forecasts, should condition on both variables, lagged inﬂation and
lagged output. Yet, such forecasts fail to be simple and are thus not available
to agents.
Adam (2005) shows that Model Π outperforms Model Y whenever the
elasticity of labor supply ε is larger than some critical value εc,w h e r eεc ≈
8As is easy to see, no other RPE in Model Y exists.
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RPE in Model Π ceases to exist.9
Figure 1 illustrates the response of output and inﬂation to a nominal
demand shock vt when the economy is in a RPE in Model Y.10 Output
increases for two periods and inﬂation reacts in a sluggish but persistent
way. Nominal demand shocks thus strongly propagate through the economy
unlike in the rational expectations equilibrium.
Figure 2 shows a simulation of the behavior of output and inﬂation for
the RPE in Model Π when shocks repeatedly hit the economy.11 Output
and inﬂation then display persistent deviations from steady state and regular
cyclical patterns. Again this contrasts strongly with the rational expecta-
tions prediction where these variables are white noise.
5T h e E x p e r i m e n t s
5.1 Implementation
Experiments took place at the University of Salerno, Italy and at the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt, Germany. In each experimental session ﬁve subjects
participated with no subject taking part in more than one session. Most
subjects were undergraduate business and engineering majors.
At the start of the experiments subjects receive written instructions,
which are reproduced in appendix A.5. Instructions inform subjects that
they have to repeatedly forecast future inﬂation rates and how their pay is
related to their forecasting performance. Subjects neither know the steady
state values of output and inﬂation nor any other feature of the underlying
economy. Subjects are then introduced to the MacroLab software package,
which is used to implement the experiments.12
The experiment evolves as follows. In any period t subjects observe the
history of output and inﬂation up to period t − 1 and are asked to forecast
inﬂation for periods t and t+1.13 Importantly, subjects can enter any fore-
cast they wish and subjects know nothing about rational forecasts, Model Y
9Model Y forecasts then always outperform the predictions generated by Model Π and
the REE is the only equilibrium.
10Figure 1 assumes ε =2 , y =1 0 0 ,a n dΠ =1 .04, which is the parameterization used
in most of the experiments later on.
11Figures 2 assumes ε =2 , y = 100, Π =1 .04, and vt ∼ iiU[−1,1],w h i c hi st h e
parameterization used in most of the experiments later on.
12The software is available from the author upon request.
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respectively, are then averaged across agents and substituted for the expec-
tations in the temporary equilibrium (3). This together with a draw for
the exogenous demand shock vt determines output and inﬂation for period
t.14 The new values for output and inﬂation are announced to subjects and
subjects receive points for past forecasts of the newly announced inﬂation
rate. Thereafter, the process repeats itself.
The points earned during an experimental treatment are added up and
converted into cash payments according to a linear conversion rate an-
nounced at the end of the experimental session. Conversion rates are calcu-
lated to make an average payment of 30 Euros for subjects participating in
single treatment sessions and 60 Euros (50 Euros) for subjects participating
in double treatment sessions in Germany (Italy). The average hourly pay-
ment per session was in all cases larger than 12 Euros (8 Euros) in Germany
(Italy).
5.2 Sessions and Treatments
Six experimental sessions with two diﬀerent experimental treatments have
been implemented. Table 1 lists details of the experimental sessions and
treatments.
As a baseline case I consider a high-elasticity treatment, in which the
elasticity of labor supply is set to ε =2 . In high-elasticity treatments a
RPE coexists with the REE, whenever agents restrict attention to the set
of simple forecasting models (7).
Treatment 1 of Sessions 1 to 4 are the baseline experiments for assessing
the performance of the REE and RPE in such high-elasticity treatments.
To check for the stability of the results over time, subjects participating in
Sessions 3 and 4 are subjected to a second high-elasticity treatment.
As a further robustness check I consider low-elasticity treatments in
Sessions 5 and 6. The elasticity of labor supply in these sessions is set
to ε =1 . The REE is then the only equilibrium, even if agents restrict
consideration to simple forecasts functions.
Since the other model parameters do not aﬀect the existence of the REE
and RPE, their values are kept constant across all sessions and treatments.
In particular, the steady state inﬂation rate is 4%, the steady state output
is 100, and vt ∼ iiU[−1,1].15
14Averaging of forecasts is justiﬁed on the grounds that it represents a ﬁrst-order ap-
proximation to the exact (non-linear) aggregation of heterogeneous expectations.




Working Paper Series No. 492
June 2005Treatments in Sessions 1 to 4 last for 55 model periods and treatments
in Sessions 5 and 6 for 45 periods.16 Overall, 420 model periods have been
generated and 4200 individual inﬂation forecasts have been collected.
6 Output and Inﬂa t i o ni nt h eE x p e r i m e n t s
The output and inﬂation series emerging in the baseline experiments are
shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Output and inﬂation both display
regular and persistent deviations from steady state in all cases. In addition,
there seems to exist no tendency of these variables to converge to white noise
behavior within the 55 model periods for which the experiments are run.
The autocorrelations of output and inﬂation in the baseline experiments
are given in Table 2. The estimated correlations are positive for both vari-
ables in all cases and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% signiﬁcance
level in all but one case. Clearly, such behavior is inconsistent with the REE
prediction.
The behavior of output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h eR P Ei sg i v e nb y
yt ≈ 143.699 + .499260 · yt−1 − 90.0242 · Πt−1 + vt (10a)
Πt ≈− .472649 + 0.005000 · yt−1 + .973701 · Πt−1 (10b)
This follows from equation (9) and
α∗
Π ≈ .248842 (11a)
β∗
Π ≈ .760728 (11b)
where the equilibrium values (α∗
Π,β∗
Π) are derived in appendix A.3.
A simulation of equations (10) is shown in Figure 2. The ﬁgure shows
that the experimental outcomes are largely consistent with the behavior of
output and inﬂation predicted by the RPE. In particular, equations (10)
imply
corr(yt,y t−1) ≈ 0.70
corr(Πt,Πt−1) ≈ 0.76
The positive autocorrelation of actual output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h ee x p e r i -
mental sessions is therefore consistent with the RPE prediction.
While the experimental outcomes thus seem to be more in line with
the RPE prediction than with the REE prediction, the informal evidence
presented above is far from conclusive. Therefore, the next section provides
a formal analysis of the experimental data.
16The length of a treatment is close to 2 hours in some cases, which makes it unwise to
choose a higher number of periods.
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This section analyzes how the REE and RPE perform in explaining the ex-
perimental outcomes. Performance is evaluated by assessing how well these
equilibria explain the inﬂation forecasts entered by the subjects participat-
ing in the experiments. This is motivated by the fact that any deviation of
output and inﬂation from white noise behavior must be driven by deviations
of actual expectations from rational expectations.
Throughout the paper consideration is restricted to the inﬂation forecast
of the ’representative subject’, i.e., the average forecasts entered by subjects
in any given model period. Consideration of such a representative subject
is justiﬁed on the grounds that output and inﬂation dynamics in the experi-
mental economies are driven by average forecasts, see section 5.1. Therefore,
the equilibrium notion capturing the forecasts of the ’representative agent’
also explains the behavior of output and inﬂation.
Rational inﬂation forecasts are given by17
t−1ΠREE
t =0 .0104 · yt−1 (12a)
t−1ΠREE
t+1 =1 .04 (12b)
while in a RPE inﬂation expectations are given by18
t−1ΠRPE
t ≈ .248842 + .760728 · Πt−1 (13a)
t−1ΠRPE
t+1 ≈ .438143 + .578708 · Πt−1 (13b)
The subsequent sections compare the REE prediction (12) and the RPE
prediction (13) with the actual inﬂation forecasts entered by subjects in the
experiments.
7.1 The Unconditional Inﬂation Forecasts
In a ﬁrst step I consider the average inﬂation forecasts across agents and
model periods. Such average forecasts can be interpreted as an estimate of
the representative agent’s unconditional inﬂation forecast.
REE and RPE both predict unconditional 1-step and 2-step forecasts to
be equal to the steady state inﬂation rate. Unconditional forecasts, there-
fore, do not allow to discriminate between the REE and RPE. Yet, since
agents do not know the steady state inﬂation rate, unconditional forecasts
allow to evaluate whether REE and RPE capture the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fs u b -
jects’ inﬂation expectations. A failure to do so would be a failure of ﬁrst
order importance.
17This follows from equations (6) and the parameterization described in section 5.2.
18This follows from equations (8) and (11).
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perimental sessions. Of the 16 values reported, 12 are within 2 standard
deviations and 15 within 3 standard deviations of the predicted steady state
value of 4%.19 The average inﬂation forecasts thus are consistent with the
predictions of the REE and RPE.
The subsequent sections will consider conditional inﬂation forecasts. Con-
ditional forecasts diﬀer across the REE and RPE and thus allow to discrim-
inate between the two equilibria.
7.2 The Baseline Experiments
This section analyzes the baseline experiments, i.e., Treatment 1 of Sessions
1 to 4. In the baseline experiments the REE and RPE coexist, provided
agents restrict consideration to simple forecast models.
Figures 5 to 8 depict subject’s actual inﬂation forecasts together with
the REE prediction (12) of these forecasts. It is obvious from these ﬁgures
that in all sessions REE forecasts perform rather poorly in explaining agents’
actual inﬂation forecasts. Agents’ 1-step forecasts clearly lag the REE pre-
diction and agents’ 2-step forecasts display regular cyclical patterns that is
at odds with the REE prediction of a constant forecast. Also, there seems
to be no tendency of actual forecasts to converge over time to the behavior
predicted by REE forecasts.
Figures 9 to 12 depict subject’s actual inﬂation forecasts together with
the RPE prediction (13) of the forecasts. In all sessions agents’ 1-step fore-
casts are captured surprisingly well by the RPE-forecasts. The same holds
for agents’ 2-step forecasts, except for Sessions 1 and 3 where the perfor-
mance of RPE forecasts seems to deteriorate somewhat towards the end of
the treatment.
The evidence in Figures 5 to 12 provides overwhelming support in favor
of the RPE. The close ﬁt between RPE-forecasts and actual forecasts is
remarkable since RPE-forecasts are calculated without taking into account
agents’ actual forecasts: RPE forecas t sr e l yo n l yo ni n f o r m a t i o nt h a ti s
available to agents at the time of forecasting.20
The visual impression from Figures 5 to 12 is conﬁrmed by a more for-
mal analysis. To assess how well the REE and RPE explain the inﬂation
19The low values in Session 6 are partly driven by one subject which entered large
negative forecasts in period 12 of the experiment.
20A surprising feature of the experimental data is the speed at which agents seem to
be able to coordinate on the RPE. I have not been able to come up with a convincing
explanation for this phenomenon.
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 492
June 2005forecasts of the experiments, I report OLS-estimates of the parameter β for
the following regression
t−1Πactual
t+i = α + β · t−1ΠRPE
t+i +( 1− β) · t−1ΠREE
t+i
where t−1Πactual
t+i denotes the actual time t − 1 forecast of the t + i inﬂation
rate (i =0 ,1)a n dt−1ΠREE
t+i and t−1ΠRPE
t+i the corresponding equilibrium
forecasts in a REE and RPE, respectively, as given by equations (12) and
(13). The estimate for β can be interpreted as the share of agents using the
RPE-forecasts. A value of β close to 1 indicates that the RPE explains the
forecast functions well, while a value close to zero indicates that the REE
oﬀers a superior description of the forecast function.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 4 reports the estimated share of RPE-forecasters
β for the 1-step inﬂation forecasts. Estimates are reported for the entire
treatment and the last 20 periods to assess whether there is some variation
over time due to learning processes taking place.
The point estimates in the upper panel of Table 4 are relatively close
to 1 and imply that in each treatment more than 85% of agents use RPE-
forecasts. The shares are estimated rather precisely and there are only weak
signs (in Session 1 and 3) that they are signiﬁcantly lower in the last 20
periods of the treatments.
The second panel of Table 4 reports the β estimates for the 2-step fore-
casts. The RPE-forecasts clearly dominate in Sessions 2 and 4. Also, in
these sessions the dominance of RPE-forecasts appears to be stable over
time. RPE-forecasts also perform well in the ﬁrst part of Sessions 1 and
3 but towards the end of the treatment the performance of RPE deterio-
rates.21 This should hardly be surprising given the evidence shown in the
lower panels of Figures 9 and 11.
Overall, however, the baseline experiments provide overwhelming evi-
dence in favor of the RPE. While the RPE captures agents inﬂation fore-
casts in most of the sessions, the REE does not oﬀer a good description of
subjects’ inﬂation expectations in any of the baseline sessions.
Figure 13 provides additional support for this claim by depicting actual
inﬂation rates together with the forecasted rates.22 For rational forecasts the
diﬀerence between the actual and forecasted inﬂation series is white noise.
21Although the point estimate for β is low for the last 20 periods of Sessions 1 and 3,
REE forecasts fail to capture actual 2-step forecasts, as should be clear from Figures 5
and 7. In the regressions this manifests itself by low R
2 values.
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forecasts lag actual inﬂation.23 As a result, forecast errors are strongly
positively autocorrelated, a feature consistent with the RPE but not with
the REE.
The next subsection analyzes the data from Sessions 1 and 3 in greater
detail. In these sessions the performance of RPE 2-step forecasts deterio-
rated towards the end of the treatment.
7 . 2 . 1 W h a tH a p p e n e di nS e s s i o n s1a n d3 ?
Figure 14 depicts actual 2-step forecasts from Sessions 1 and 3 together with
the following output-based forecast function:
t−1Πe
t+1 ≈ 0.4172 + 0.0062yt−1 (14)
Towards the end of the treatments agents’ 2-step forecasts seem to be cap-
tured rather well by equation (14). Moreover, forecasts (14) start to perform
well precisely when the performance of the RPE-forecasts starts to deteri-
orate, see the lower panels of Figures 9 and 11. This suggests that agents
participating in Sessions 1 and 3 have substituted their RPE 2-step forecast
function (13b) with the output-based forecast function (14).
Forecast function (14) is the optimal simple 2-step inﬂation forecast for
an economy that is in a RPE, as the data suggest to be the case for the ﬁrst
half of the considered sessions.24
It might come as a surprise that the optimal simple 2-step forecast func-
tion diﬀers from the RPE 2-step forecast function (13b). RPE 2-step fore-
casts are suboptimal because they are obtained by iterating forward the
optimal simple 1-step forecast equation (13a). Although iteration is the
standard procedure in econometrics to derive a multi-step prediction from
a linear econometric model, it is suboptimal here since the 1-step forecast
function is misspeciﬁed, e.g., Bhansali (2002) for a discussion.
Instead of iterating 1-step forecasts, a superior simple 2-step forecast
is obtained by regressing inﬂation directly on twice lagged output or twice
lagged inﬂation. Doing so one ﬁnds that function (14) delivers the optimal
simple forecast when the economy is in a RPE.
The somewhat informal discussion above can be supported by a more
formal analysis. The lower panel of Table 4 lists the OLS-estimate of β
23The ﬁgure depicts the actual inﬂation rate and past forecasts of this inﬂation rate at
the same point of the x-axis, so this feature is not due to a problem of representation.
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t−1Πactual
t+1 = α + β · t−1ΠRPE





t+1 denotes the forecast given in equation (14).
While Sessions 2 and 4 do not show any signs of subjects switching
towards the output-based forecast rule (14), there are strong indications
for such behavior in Sessions 1 and 3. The point estimates imply that the
large majority of agents used output-based 2-step forecasts during the last
20 periods of the treatment.
The previous ﬁndings suggest that agents’ in Sessions 1 and 3 have be-
come aware that their iterated 2-step forecast is suboptimal and have started
to use diﬀerent forecast models for diﬀerent forecast horizons.
7.3 Robustness Check I: Additional High-Elasticity Treat-
ments
To check for the stability of the results from the baseline experiments, sub-
jects participating in Sessions 3 and 4 are subjected to an additional high-
elasticity treatment. The results of these treatments are analyzed in this
section.
In some of the baseline experiments subjects switched to output-based
2-step forecasts towards the end of the treatment. One can thus ask for
the potential rest points of a learning process where agents condition 1-step
forecasts on inﬂation and 2-step forecasts on output. Such a rest point could
be expected to emerge in the additional high-elasticity treatments analyzed
in this section.
Appendix A.4 shows that there exists a unique stationary rest point
where agents use an optimal inﬂation-based 1-step forecast and an optimal
output-based 2-step forecast.25 This rest point will be referred to as the
mixed-forecast situation subsequently. The forecast functions in the mixed-
forecast situation are given by
t−1Πe
t ≈ 0.6887 + 0.3378 · Πt−1 (15a)
t−1Πe
t+1 ≈ 0.7373 + 0.003027 · yt−1 (15b)
Importantly, equations (15) do not describe an equilibrium, i.e., a situation
where agents use optimal simple forecast functions for each forecast horizon.
If agents use equations (15) to forecast, a 1-step forecast with output as the
explanatory variable would dominate the inﬂation-based forecast (15a). The
25Optimality is again deﬁned in terms of mean-squared forecast errors.
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variables that enter the respective forecast functions.
Despite this suboptimality, one can reasonably expect that equations
(15) at least initially describe subjects’ actual forecast behavior. Clearly,
once agents substitute the inﬂation-based 1-step forecast (15a) by an output-
based forecast, the REE should emerge. To assess whether convergence to
the REE occurs, this section compares the mixed-forecasts (15) against the
REE forecasts (12).
Importantly, the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation in equation (15a) has the
same sign as in the RPE.26 Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on lagged output
in equation (15b) has the same sign as in equation (14). Therefore, the
learning process should not cause major problems for the analysis.
Figures 15 and 16 depict actual forecasts, REE forecasts, and mixed
forecasts for the second treatment of Sessions 3 and 4. Interpretation of the
data from Session 3 is somewhat diﬃcult because one subject experimented
w i t hl a r g en e g a t i v ei n ﬂation forecasts in period 16-22 to learn about the
economy’s reaction to these forecasts.27
The ﬁgures suggest that in both sessions 1-step forecasts are still cap-
tured far better by the (inﬂation-based) mixed-forecast than by the (output-
based) REE-forecast. This is conﬁrmed by the quantitative evidence pre-
sented in the upper panel of Table 5. The share of agents using the (inﬂation-
based) mixed forecast function is estimated to be close to one and is not
signiﬁcantly lower in the last 20 periods of the treatments. Thus, regard-
ing 1-step forecasts there is no evidence in favor of a convergence process
towards the REE.28 At the same time the mixed-forecast situation captures
1-step forecasts rather well.
Figures 15 and 16 also suggests that 2-step forecasts seem to be more
in line with the mixed-forecasts than with the REE-forecasts, in particular
towards the end of the treatments.
The visual impression is again conﬁrmed by the quantitative results re-
ported in the second and third panel of Table 5. The second panel shows that
26This might explain why in all baseline experiments agents’ actual 1-step forecasts
remain to be captured rather well by the RPE 1-step forecasts even though 2-step RPE-
forecasts have been replaced by output-based forecasts in some of these sessions.
27T h es u b j e c tm e n t i o n e dt om et h a th ee x p e r i m e n t e da f t e rt h ee n do ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .
He also mentioned that he had abandoned experimentation after a while as it became too
costly and did not generate a lot of information.
28T h e r ei ss o m ee v i d e n c et h a ta ctual forecasts initially ﬂuctuate more than the mixed
1-step forecasts (15a) suggest. This is likely to be the case because agents still use the
RPE-forecast, which has a larger coeﬃcient on the lagged inﬂation term.
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in Session 3, where interpretation is hampered by the fact that one subject
experimented with large negative forecasts. The third panel illustrates that
almost all agents seem to use output-based forecast rules.
Overall, the additional high-elasticity treatments suggest that agents’
forecast functions moved into the direction of the mixed forecast situation
(15), which oﬀers a better description of subjects’ inﬂation forecasts than
both the REE forecasts and the RPE forecasts. After more than 110 model
periods the REE thus does not yet emerge as the dominant explanation
of the data. This, of course, does not exclude that additional treatments
would eventually cause it to become the dominant explanation. Given the
logic according to which agents seem to substitute their forecast functions,
the mixed forecast situation can be expected to be transient. Investigating
this issue, however, is left for further research.
7.4 Robustness Check II: Low Elasticity Treatments
This section discusses the results from the low-elasticity treatments in Ses-
sions 5 and 6. In a low-elasticity economy the RPE does not exist even if
agents restrict attention to the class of simple forecast functions (7).
Figure 17 depicts actual forecasts and REE-forecasts from Session 5.
While in the ﬁrst 25 periods the REE 1-step forecasts tend to peak before
actual forecasts, the REE and actual forecasts move in a highly synchronized
fashion after some time. Towards the end of the experimental treatment the
ﬁt between the two forecasts seems to be much better than after the 110
periods of high-elasticity treatment applied in Sessions 3 and 4.
While the 2-step forecasts still display some cyclical variation, the stan-
dard deviation of 2-step forecasts is rather small. The 2-step forecasts thus
also seem to be roughly in line with the REE prediction.
Figure 18 displays information on Session 6. Interpretation of the ex-
perimental outcome is complicated by the fact that in period 12 one subject
entered large negative values for the inﬂation forecast.29 This caused inﬂa-
tion to be low and output to be high. The high output level subsequently
caused a strong rise in inﬂation. This strong cyclical ’swing’ in the data
m i g h tw e l lh a v ei n ﬂuenced agents’ forecast functions. Correspondingly, the
signs in favor of the REE are much weaker for this session. 1-step forecasts
peak well before actual forecasts even towards the end of the treatment.
29It is not entirely clear whether the forecast was an attempt to obtain information
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Session 5. Yet, variability seems to decrease over time.
The visual impression from Figures 17 and 18 is conﬁrmed by a more
formal analysis. Since an RPE does not exist in low-elasticity treatments,
one has to compare the ability of REE-forecasts to explain actual forecasts
with the ability to do so in high elasticity treatments.
Table 6 reports results of such a comparison for the 1-step forecasts. The
table reports for all sessions and treatments the coeﬃcient δ obtained from
estimating equation
t−1Πactual
t = γ + δ · t−1ΠREE
t (16)
using ordinary least squares.
While for the low-elasticity treatments δ is signiﬁcant and positive, it
is either insigniﬁcant or negative for the high-elasticity treatments. This
together with the fact that δ is very high in the last 20 periods of Ses-
sion 5 suggests that in low-elasticity treatments the REE-forecasts oﬀers a
much better explanation of actual 1-step forecasts than in high-elasticity
treatments.
Table 7 reports evidence on 2-step forecasts. The table presents results
from regressing on a constant the squared deviation of actual 2-step fore-
casts from REE 2-step forecasts. For Session 5 the estimated constant is
signiﬁcantly lower than in all other high elasticity sessions. This holds true
for the whole sample and the last 20 periods of the treatment. For Ses-
sion 6 the picture is somewhat mixed, which is most likely due to the large
negative forecast mentioned above. Nevertheless, in the last 20 periods of
Session 6 the squared deviation is still signiﬁcantly lower than in all but one
high-elasticity treatment.
The previous evidence indicates that in low-elasticity treatments the
REE performs signiﬁcantly better than in high-elasticity sessions. Especially
evidence from Session 5 seems largely consistent with the REE towards the
end of the treatment. This has not been the case in any of the high-elasticity
treatments.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The experiments show that deviations of expectations from rational expecta-
tions can play an important role in enhancing the internal propagation mech-
anism of simple macroeconomic models. Less than rational expectations can
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 492
June 2005generate considerable persistence of output and inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et on o m -
inal shocks where rational expectations predict these variables to display no
persistence at all. Non-rationalities in agents’ expectations may thus pro-
vide a substitute for a range of other frictions generally required to generate
such behavior under rational expectations.
The experimental outcomes suggest that the forecasting technology em-
ployed by relatively unsophisticated forecasters can be captured by simple
forecast functions that condition on a single explanatory variable. Agents,
however, seem to be aware that their simple forecast models are possibly mis-
speciﬁed. Therefore, after having gained experience with their environment,
agents start to use diﬀerent forecast models for diﬀerent forecast horizons.
This leads to deviations from the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium.
Given the results of this paper, it seems important to learn whether
Restricted Perceptions Equilibria with simple forecast function also cap-
ture subjects’ expectations in other experimental economies. Considering
an experimental economy with a RPE in which forecasts are optimal at
each forecast horizon appears to be of particular interest. This would al-
low to assess whether Restricted Perceptions Equilibria can be truly stable
over time or whether they are just transitory phenomena of an economy
ultimately converging to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium.
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A.1 Details of the structural model
Below I outline a highly stylized business cycle model with monopolistic
competition (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) where ﬁrms set prices one period
in advance. In slight deviation from a standard setup there are two kinds
of agents: entrepreneurs who own monopolistically competitive ﬁrms and
ﬁnance consumption using the monopolistic proﬁts; workers who ﬁnance
consumption by oﬀering their work force on a competitive labor market.
To make the distinction between workers and entrepreneurs economically
relevant, contingent claim markets that would allow for risk sharing between
workers and entrepreneurs are assumed to be unavailable. The previous
setting insures that workers’ labor supply decisions do not depend on current
and expected future proﬁts and this simpliﬁes the analysis.






























t denotes consumption, mi
t the entrepreneur’s real money holdings at
the end of period t, τt the real value of a possibly negative government cash
transfer, Πt the inﬂation factor from period t−1 to t,a n dΦi
t the monopoly
rents from ownership of ﬁrm i.T h eﬁrst constraint forces entrepreneurs to
use money to pay for consumption goods. The second constraint is the ﬂow
budget constraint.
Each ﬁrm i produces an intermediate consumption good qi which is an















with 1 >σ≥ 0
Proﬁt maximization implies that each ﬁrm sets its price Pi
t as a ﬁxed mark-
up over expected production costs. When the production technology is linear






where Pt denotes the price index of the ﬁnal consumption good and wt the
real wage. Dividing the previous equation by Pt−1 and assuming that all
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Equation (17) summarizes optimal behavior by ﬁrms.
Next, consider workers. Each worker j ∈ [0,1] chooses consumption c
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When u, v ∈ C2, u0 > 0,u 00 < 0, v0 > 0, v00 ≥ 0, −
u00(c)·c
u
0(c) < 1 for all c ≥ 0,
and the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, utility maximization implies
a labor supply function of the form:30
nt = n(wt,E t[Πt+1])
Inverting this labor supply function with respect to the ﬁr s ta r g u m e n td e -
livers an expression for the real wage:







where the linearity of the production function has been used to substitute
nt by yt. Given the speciﬁed utility functions, the real wage increases in the
demand for labor and in the expected inﬂation tax.
Finally, consider the government which issues money via lump sum trans-






where τt is a mean zero white noise shock with small bounded support and
is the only source of randomness in the model. When prices are preset and
the cash-in-advance constraint is binding for all agents, output is demand
determined in the short run and the previous equation is a speciﬁcation of
30For simplicity I assume that agents hold point expectations, as is standard in the
learning literature. Once the model is linearized, however, the point expectations may be
interpreted as the mean of expectations with non-trivial support.
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which is equation (2). Substituting (18) into (17) delivers (1).
The linearization coeﬃcients (4) and (5) are obtained from (17) and (18)
using the following equations to simplify expressions:










Equations (20) and (21) are steady state versions of (17) and (18), respec-
tively, and (22) follows from applying the implicit function theorem to work-
ers’ ﬁrst order condition with a binding cash-in-advance constraint.
A.2 Uniqueness of REE
To prove uniqueness, I derive the Blanchard-Kahn form of model (3). Since


















































where yt−1 and Πt are ’predetermined’. Inverting the matrix on the l.h.s.,
the resulting matrix in front of the endogenous variables on the r.h.s. has
two eigenvalues equal to zero and another eigenvalue equal to ε+1
Πε .T h u s ,
as long as ε+1
εΠ > 1, there exists a unique stationary REE. For τ suﬃciently
small, as has been assumed, Π ≈ 1 at the low inﬂation steady state and this
inequality holds as long as ε>0.
A.3 Calculating (αΠ,β Π) in Model Π Equilibrium






αΠ = Π(1 − βΠ) (24)
32Along a deterministic equilibrium path where the expected inﬂation factor is above
the discount factor, the cash-in-advance constraint strictly binds if initial money balances
are not too high. Also, in the stochastic case with small support for the shocks, surprise
deﬂation and shocks to real cash holdings will be small implying that agents will always
wish to spend their entire money balances for consumption.
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to (9). Let B denote the AR-matrix in (9) and vec be the column-wise
vectorization operator. Then taking variances on both sides of (9) and
assuming stationarity implies that
vec(Σ)=( I − B ⊗ B)−1vec(Ω) (25)














one obtains the expression for the numerator in (23). Equation (23) thus
implies that βΠ solves
βΠ =
βΠ(1 − 1














For the high-elasticity parameterization this equation has one real and two
imaginary solutions for βΠ.T h ev a l u ef o rαΠ can be obtained from equation
(24).
A.4 The Mixed Forecast Situation
Suppose agents use the following 1-step and 2-step forecast model:
Πt = α + βΠt−1 (27a)
Πt+1 = γ + δyt−1 (27b)










α =( 1− β)Π
γ = Π − δy
where variables without subscript denote steady state values.
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Since the constant a in (30) does not inﬂuence the covariances one can ignore








=( I − B ⊗ B)−1vec(Ω)
where vec(·), Σ,a n dΩ are as deﬁned in appendix A.3. Multiplying (30)




where Γi is the covariance matrix of output and inﬂation with i-times lagged






−1 − βΠ(1 − Πε)+ε(Π − δy)
εΠ2 − β(1 − Πε)









Π2 − 4(−1+εΠ)(1 − εΠ + δεy)
2(−1+εΠ)
which depend on δ. Substituting β1 into (29) using the expressions for the
covariances derived above and solving for δ with Π =1 .04 and ε =2delivers
two real and two imaginary solutions for δ. However, both real solutions
imply values for β1 smaller than −1 which would contradict stationarity of
the inﬂation rate.
Substituting β2 into (29) and solving for δ with Π =1 .04 and ε =2
delivers three real solutions for δ. Only one of these solutions implies a
value of |β2| < 1.T h i si st h es o l u t i o ns h o w ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 ) .
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General
Today you will participate in an experiment of economic decision making.
Various research foundations have provided funds for the conduct of this
research. Instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully you can
earn a considerable amount of money. The average payment will be around
60.000 Lire but, depending on how well you do, you may well earn up to
120.000 Lire.
You are assigned the role of a private agent whose task is to forecast
t h er a t eo fi n ﬂa t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m y .I ne a c he x p e r i m e n t a lp e r i o dt ,y o ua r e
asked to forecast the inﬂation rate for the next two periods, i.e. the inﬂation
rate for period t+1 and for period t+2.
In period t when you make your inﬂation predictions for t+1 and t+2 you
can observe the current and past data of the economy. This data consists
of the current and past inﬂation rates and the current and past levels of
real GDP, where real GDP is the quantity of goods that is produced in the
economy.
At the beginning of an experiment when you start forecasting, there is
just a single data point that consists of the current inﬂation rate and output
level. After you have made your forecasts the experiment period will end
and a new experiment period will start for which a new inﬂation rate and
output level will be announced. Thus, as the experiment evolves you will
have an increasing number of observations.
There will be various experiment ’sessions’. For each ’session’ the econ-
omy will restart from period zero. Each session is unrelated to the previous
session, in the sense that the level of inﬂation and output will be diﬀerent
across sessions. Also the relationships between inﬂation and output and
past values of these variables is not necessarily the same from one session
to another. The end of a session and the beginning of a new session will be
clearly announced by the experimenter.
Earnings
During each period of an experiment session you will collect ’points’
which at the end of the session will be transformed into Lira, as described
below. The number of points that you get will depend on how close your in-
ﬂation predictions are to the actual inﬂation rates. The details are explained
now:
Each period t, the new inﬂation rate and the new output level are an-
nounced. You will have predicted the current inﬂation rate two diﬀerent
times, once 1 period ago and once 2 periods ago.
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Let f denote the absolute value of your forecast error from one of these
forecasts. The error is expressed in percentage points, i.e. if f =1 .5 your
forecast was either 1.5% higher or lower than the actual inﬂation rate.
The points that you receive will depend on the errors f you make where





You can receive up to 300 points per forecast and may lose up to 100
points depending on the size of the forecast error. With a zero forecast
error you would receive 300 points. However, if your forecast is 1% higher
or lower than the actual inﬂation rate you will get only 100 points (400/2-
100), likewise for a 3% forecast error you receive no points (300/3-100), and
for even larger forecast errors points will be subtracted. The graph below
shows the relationship between the forecast error and the points that your
receive for your forecast.
You will receive points for each of the two forecast you made for the
current inﬂation rate, i.e. you receive points for the forecast you made 1
period ago and points for the forecast you made 2 periods ago, where the
number of points for each forecast depends on the forecast error as described
above.
After the experimenter has announced the end of an experiment session,
write down the total number of points that you received on a sheet of paper
with your name on it. Brieﬂy after the end of the session, the experimenter
will announce a conversion rate that indicates the value of the points in
terms of Lira.
Other Instructions
During the experiment sessions it is strictly forbidden to speak with
other students that participate in the experiment. Doing so can lead to the
exclusion from the experiment. In this case no payment will be made. If you
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June 2005have any questions or problems during the course of the experiment raise
your hand and the experimenter will come to you.
At the start of each experiment session you will be asked to start the
program that runs on your computer. Please carefully follow the instructions
that you will receive from the experimenter.
If you have any questions please ask them now!
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Figure 2: Output and Inﬂation in the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
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Figure 3: Output in the Experimental Sessions
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Figure 4: Inﬂation in the Experimental Sessions
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Figure 5: Actual Forecasts and RE Forecasts, Session 1 (T1)
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Figure 6: Actual Forecasts and RE Forecasts, Session 2 (T1)
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Figure 7: Actual Forecasts and RE Forecasts, Session 3 (T1)
40
ECB

















1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53
Actual 
REE
Figure 8: Actual Forecasts and RE Forecasts, Session 4 (T1)
41
ECB



















13579 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 7 1 9 2 1 2 3 2 5 2 7 2 9 3 1 3 3 3 5 3 7 3 9 4 1 4 3 4 5 4 7 4 9 5 1 5 3
Actual 
RPE
Figure 9: Actual Forecasts and Restricted Perceptions, Session 1 (T1)
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Figure 10: Actual Forecasts and Restricted Perceptions, Session 2 (T1)
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Figure 11: Actual Forecasts and Restricted Perceptions, Session 3 (T1)
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Figure 12: Actual Forecasts and Restricted Perceptions, Session 4 (T1)
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Figure 13: Actual and Predicted Inﬂation, Session 4 (T1)
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Figure 14: Output-Based 2-Step Forecasts
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Figure 15: Sessions 3 (T2)
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Figure 16: Session 4 (T2)
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Figure 17: Session 5 (T1)
50
ECB


















13579 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 7 1 9 2 1 2 3 2 5 2 7 2 9 3 1 3 3 3 5 3 7 3 9 4 1 4 3
Actual 
REE
Figure 18: Session 6 (T1)
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Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Location Date
(T1) (T2)
Session 1 high - Salerno, Italy July 16, 2001
Session 2 high - Salerno, Italy July 23, 2001
Session 3 high high Frankfurt, Germany June 3, 2002
Session 4 high high Frankfurt, Germany June 7, 2002
Session 5 low - Salerno, Italy July 2, 2001
Session 6 low - Salerno, Italy July 24,2001
The highlighted treatments and sessions constitute the baseline
experiments. ’low’ indicates treatments where the elasticity of labor
supply is set to ε =1 .0; ’high’ indicates treatments where the elasticity
is set to ε =2 .0.




Session 1 (T1) 0.53 0.38
(0.00) (0.00)
Session 2 (T1) 0.47 0.57
(0.00) (0.00)
Session 3 (T1) 0.46 0.23
(0.00) (0.08)
Session 4 (T1) 0.64 0.62
(0.00) (0.00)
Numbers in brackets are p-values for the Box-Ljung Q-statistic testing
the null of no autocorrelation.
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June 2005Table 3: Average Inﬂation Forecasts (Across Agents and Periods)
Average 1-Step Forecast Average 2-Step Forecast
Session 1 (T1) 4.03 4.01
(0.1584) (0.1316)
Session 2 (T1) 3.89 3.90
(0.0972) (0.0771)
Session 3 (T1) 4.75 4.90
(0.5138) (0.3302)
Session 3 (T2) 3.64 3.65
(0.2801) (0.2642)
Session 4 (T1) 3.95 3.94
(0.1481) (0.1257)
Session 4 (T2) 4.48 4.43
(0.3104) (0.2202)
Session 5 (T1) 4.16 4.14
(0.0605) (0.0535)
Session 6 (T1) 3.58 3.61
(0.2284) (0.1232)
Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) in parentheses.
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1-Step Forecast Share of RPE-Forecasters (vs. REE)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 1 (T1) 0.887 0.747
(0.0324) (0.0427)
Session 2 (T1) 0.881 0.855
(0.0148) (0.0265)
Session 3 (T1) 0.873 0.778
(0.0319) (0.0530)
Session 4 (T1) 0.989 0.969
(0.0180) (0.0228)
2-Step Forecast Share of RPE-Forecasters (vs. REE)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 1 (T1) 0.534 0.168
(0.1477) (0.1552)
Session 2 (T1) 0.694 0.687
(0.0501) (0.0584)
Session 3 (T1) 0.212 -0.436
(0.1896) (0.1435)
Session 4 (T1) 1.087 1.069
(0.0704) (0.0677)
2-Step Forecast Share of RPE-Forecasters (vs. Ouput-Based)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 1 (T1) 0.713 0.354
(0.0892) (0.1025)
Session 2 (T1) 0.792 0.744
(0.0286) (0.0407)
Session 3 (T1) 0.508 0.068
(0.1197) (0.0947)
Session 4 (T1) 0.988 0.928
(0.0474) (0.0334)
Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) in parentheses.
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1-Step Forecast Share of Mixed-Forecasters (vs. REE)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 3 (T2) 1.14 0.933
(0.0646) (0.0912)
Session 4 (T2) 0.950 0.890
(0.0792) (0.1663)
2-Step Forecasts Share of Mixed-Forecasters (vs. REE)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 3 (T2) 0.344 0.449
(0.3561) (0.3468)
Session 4 (T2) 0.609 0.812
(0.2715) (0.5870)
2-Step Forecast Share of Mixed-Forecasters (vs. RPE)
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 3 (T2) 0.835 0.711
(0.1119) (0.1437)
Session 4 (T2) 0.795 1.034
(0.0887) (0.1493)
Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) in parentheses. Session 3 included
a dummy variable for period 20 to 30.
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1-Step Forecast Coeﬃcient on REE Forecasts
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 5 (T1) 0.333 0.717
(0.0766) (0.0927)
Session 6 (T1) 0.226 0.216
(0.0633) (0.1055)
Session 1 (T1) -0.136 0.029
(0.0468) (0.1147)
Session 2 (T1) -0.025 -0.059
(0.0450) (0.0923)
Session 3 (T1) -0.168 -0.182
(0.0455) (0.0993)
Session 4 (T1) -0.253 -0.249
(0.0517) (0.0993)
Session 3 (T2) -0.220 0.000
(0.0776) (0.1295)
Session 4 (T2) -0.0776 -0.002
(0.0733) (0.1765)
Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) in parentheses.
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2-Step Forecast (Actual - REE Forecast)2
whole sample last 20 periods
Session 5 (T1) 0.116 0.007
(0.0244) (0.0369)
Session 6 (T1) 1.260 0.321
(0.3941) (0.0720)
Session 1 (T1) 0.787 0.9839
(0.1044) (0.1207)
Session 2 (T1) 0.1945 0.298
(0.0332) (0.0554)
Session 3 (T1) 9.123 10.119
(1.6336) (2.2004)
Session 4 (T1) 0.493 0.886
(0.1106) (0.1642)
Session 3 (T2) 3.307 1.102
(0.7934) (0.4665)
Session 4 (T2) 4.672 3.922
(0.7331) (0.8545)
Newey-West standard errors (3 lags) in parentheses.
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